Eric Salem on Aristotle and Harman

I just read through Eric Salem’s contribution to the new book Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics, a chapter titled “Object and Οὐσία: Harman and Aristotle on the Being of Things.” The book has a lot of Deleuze stuff going on, including a new translation of a Deleuze essay from the early ‘60s about Lucretius. While I mainly concentrated on Eric Salem’s chapter, I would certainly recommend Adriel M. Trott’s chapter, “Does It Matter?” She asks whether the difference between form and matter in Aristotle is itself to be conceived in material or formal terms, and links this problem to sexual difference. Trott arrives at the strange conclusion that material in Aristotle is “inscribed with form” insofar as it is capable of leading to distinctions such as sexual difference. It’s an interesting reading of a work by Aristotle that I’ve never read before, and seems to have a vital materialist aspect.

The Salem essay examines the connection between Aristotle and Graham Harman from the perspective of an ancient Greek scholar. In a brief aside, Salem mentions that the problem of how to distinguish arbitrary aggregates from genuine objects is a sticking point for him about Harman’s philosophy. This actually relates to what I consider a genuine blind spot in Salem’s understanding of Harman, explained in bullet points below. Overall, though, I find the essay refreshing and vividly executed. Within the context of speculative realism commentary, it’s like coming in from an unending Edge of Tomorrow war zone to play a game of chess and drink a smoothie. Continue reading “Eric Salem on Aristotle and Harman”

Musicology and Peter Wolfendale

There are two reasons I am bringing up Peter Wolfendale here. One is that I was just reminded of him when I noticed that a fellow named Louis Morelle has recently applauded Wolfendale in an article titled “The Trouble With Ontological Liberalism.” Wolfendale, the confident anti-follower of Graham Harman, need no longer proclaim in a published book that his voice has been silenced, since it echoes unchanged in the hills of France.

My second reason has to do with my own project in musicology. At a baby shower in Brooklyn some time ago, I met a philosophy graduate student who had glanced through Wolfendale’s article “The Noumenon’s New Clothes.” He said he thought it did a good job, even though he was not up on speculative realism. (In other words, the article plays its role well for non-readers of its target.) “Very rigorous,” he said, and did I know it was expanded into a whole book? I was appreciative. I wanted and still want to avoid writing a dissertation that applies object-oriented ontology (OOO) to musicology without incorporating some good criticism. My own evaluation of what it does and doesn’t do for musicology would then get strong support…

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Ce n’est pas un cliché banal. Continue reading “Musicology and Peter Wolfendale”

Extra thought on liminal zones

The last post made me feel a little gross. I don’t like the idea of my under-informed criticisms devolving into useless, dismissive snark (which only ought to be saved for trolls and maybe Laruelle hardy har har). Now it’s true I don’t see a strong case in Levi Bryant’s recent polemic against object-oriented metaphysics, nor am I currently convinced by his defense of origami metaphysics from the charge of “undermining.” Nevertheless, Bryant – especially in the positive presentation of his own ideas – often awakens an itch in substance philosophies such as OOO: liminal zones. This is not to say I think OOO has no way to account for such fuzzy spaces, but they nag at every turn. (To see how Harman grapples with liminality, see Guerilla Metaphysics and his two most recent books, Dante’s Broken Hammer and Immaterialism.)

We might think of that classic thought experiment about the ship of Theseus, especially variations with two ships (a replica made from all of the original’s planks, or two ships exchanging their parts, or one ship transforming into another). Or we might think of the boundaries of a cloud, or conjoined twins, or a boy vanishing into the woods for a month who returns a man, or outsider art. Whatever image you prefer, I would guess that making sense of liminal zones motivates Bryant. For OOO, an account of the liminal seems only to appear at the end of a treacherous mountain path, but in Bryant’s view it is more easily grasped by a smooth stroll through origami metaphysics.

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Almost there!

Continue reading “Extra thought on liminal zones”

Brief thoughts on Bryant’s Origami

I’ve had the chance to briefly return to Levi Bryant, since the final published version of his article “The Interior of Things: The Origami of Being” has just become available. In my previous post about it, I end up defending Graham Harman’s OOO from Bryant’s critique. But that addresses just half of Bryant’s article. In the other half, he defends his own origami metaphysics against the possible charge of undermining. This can be seen as part of a larger conversation started in The Speculative Turn, where Harman proposes his two well-known polemical notions of undermining and overmining (“On the Undermining of Objects”). Philosophies of pre-individual processes fall into the former camp. Bryant hopes to avoid undermining, and thus reach common ground with OOO through an alternative conception of the object. I doubt he really believes it, though. He puts “object” in scare quotes.

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Continue reading “Brief thoughts on Bryant’s Origami”

The incoherence problem: Bryant contra Harman

One of my favorite moments in the classroom as an undergraduate was getting to the end of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus—the part about how you should shut up already if you can’t talk about something. Even when quietly intoned with Cambridgey words like “whereof” and “thereof,” the teenage mind easily identifies (and identifies with) the underlying sentiment of rage at self-contradictory types who want things both ways, at tragic stories with unprepared happy twist endings, at authorities who would legislate how you spend your free time, at hubristic cosmologists who claim to know what aliens are like


(they seem friendly to me)

That desire to draw strict world-defining boundaries comes to mind when I think of the evolving dispute between Levi Bryant and Graham Harman. Continue reading “The incoherence problem: Bryant contra Harman”

Graham Harman’s book on Dante (Pt 2/3)

Following Part 1.

In the past, Harman has straightforwardly associated his model of causation with aesthetics. He shakes up that position a bit in Dante’s Broken Hammer. Though he continues to criticize anthropocentric metaphysics, he is skeptical of an art without humans and an ethics without things. To reconcile these views with OOO, he whittles down ethics and aesthetics to more specific (if still indefinite) regions of the world. As he teases in chapter 3, “the surprise of a broken hammer is not quite an aesthetic experience, [and yet] the broken hammer’s rift between the withdrawn hammer-object and the obtrusively visible hammer-qualities does stand at the gateway of aesthetics.” Here is an overview of the subject matter of the book.

The main philosophical topics in Dante’s Broken Hammer are: (1) attachment; (2) anti-formalist ethics (Kant’s two senses of autonomy); (3) charges of panpsychism and correlationism; and (4) aesthetic mimesis.

Continue reading “Graham Harman’s book on Dante (Pt 2/3)”