A few months ago, Open Culture posted a couple videos of Nirvana and Radiohead songs that have been modified by a digital tinkerer named Oleg Berg. I was particularly curious about the “Creep” one.
What interests the author of the article (Josh Jones) is that Berg has reversed the modes of these songs. The Nirvana tune used to be minor. Now it’s major. The Radiohead tune used to be major. Now it’s minor.
Fun fact: the whole band giggles whenever Jonny tries to roller-skate.
After Jones observes that the original minor key of “Smells Like Teen Spirit” is “an essential vehicle” for its anxiety and rage, he notes that the Radiohead song does something a little more complicated. Continue reading “Interesting ruination of Radiohead’s “Creep””
A rare political-ish post.
The topic is Zionism versus “intersectional” feminism (thanks Wonder Woman), and the way that hashes out in bizarre articles like this one.
A juicy summarizing quote: “It’s an open question about whether it’s possible to support Zionism while also proposing useful iterations of feminism and racial justice.” The author’s answer from the beginning is “nope,” by the way. No explanation required.
You can tell he’s smart because he points to books.
I grok the idea of opposing injustice toward disenfranchised groups like Palestinians (because duh), and I get supporting a two-state solution (because duh). What I want to know is, apart from the social justice angle, what do people mean by their polemical use of the word “Zionist“? Are they referring to all-or-nothing single-state partisans? If that’s the case, then they’re simply conflating “Zionist” with “zealot” without taking present or historical reality into account. That comes across to me as a pale leftist imitation of Trump’s methods. Or is there something else going on that I’m missing? Continue reading “Zionism contra feminism?”
I just read through Eric Salem’s contribution to the new book Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics, a chapter titled “Object and Οὐσία: Harman and Aristotle on the Being of Things.” The book has a lot of Deleuze stuff going on, including a new translation of a Deleuze essay from the early ‘60s about Lucretius. While I mainly concentrated on Eric Salem’s chapter, I would certainly recommend Adriel M. Trott’s chapter, “Does It Matter?” She asks whether the difference between form and matter in Aristotle is itself to be conceived in material or formal terms, and links this problem to sexual difference. Trott arrives at the strange conclusion that material in Aristotle is “inscribed with form” insofar as it is capable of leading to distinctions such as sexual difference. It’s an interesting reading of a work by Aristotle that I’ve never read before, and seems to have a vital materialist aspect.
The Salem essay examines the connection between Aristotle and Graham Harman from the perspective of an ancient Greek scholar. In a brief aside, Salem mentions that the problem of how to distinguish arbitrary aggregates from genuine objects is a sticking point for him about Harman’s philosophy. This actually relates to what I consider a genuine blind spot in Salem’s understanding of Harman, explained in bullet points below. Overall, though, I find the essay refreshing and vividly executed. Within the context of speculative realism commentary, it’s like coming in from an unending Edge of Tomorrow war zone to play a game of chess and drink a smoothie. Continue reading “Eric Salem on Aristotle and Harman”
NPR just put up a delightful short fluff piece with a newly released early take of The Beatles setting down verses for “Lucy In the Sky With Diamonds.”
The most fascinating thing about it is Lennon’s performance. He sings in straight eighths on words like “tangerine” and “marmalade” instead of syncopating them. Also, the vocal timbre is less stylized or instrument-like at the beginning, whereas in the final version it is basically filtered to get more overtones and fit the weird quasi-harpsichord electronic organ that Paul’s playing—think Billy Corgan. Finally, John is accompanied by a slightly distracting mechanistic bass drum on downbeats instead of the softer (and harmonically functional) bass guitar, but they probably already knew they would make that change, yeah? Paul can’t be everywhere at once.
Glimpses of the creative process for tunes like this often show how making something more aesthetically consistent (like fitting John’s voice to the overall style of the verse) means to make it more extreme, to “stylize” it even more.
I’ve had the chance to briefly return to Levi Bryant, since the final published version of his article “The Interior of Things: The Origami of Being” has just become available. In my previous post about it, I end up defending Graham Harman’s OOO from Bryant’s critique. But that addresses just half of Bryant’s article. In the other half, he defends his own origami metaphysics against the possible charge of undermining. This can be seen as part of a larger conversation started in The Speculative Turn, where Harman proposes his two well-known polemical notions of undermining and overmining (“On the Undermining of Objects”). Philosophies of pre-individual processes fall into the former camp. Bryant hopes to avoid undermining, and thus reach common ground with OOO through an alternative conception of the object. I doubt he really believes it, though. He puts “object” in scare quotes.
Continue reading “Brief thoughts on Bryant’s Origami”
As I mentioned a while back, I’m auditing a class on Adorno. Following the first two class sessions on his interests and influences, session three went deep into his theoretical labors with the essay on “Subject and Object” and chunks of Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory. My feeling at this point is that Adorno has an interesting vision, his rhetoric is annoyingly difficult to follow, and his ideas about art are inspired but with a dash of paranoia (just like his attitudes about everything else). Continue reading “Session report: Adorno”
I just ran across an old brief article (1913) by Norman Kemp Smith on the famous analogy between Kant’s philosophy and the Copernican revolution. He starts by describing the most common criticism of the analogy:
The reader very naturally conceives the Copernican revolution in terms of its main ultimate consequence, the reduction of the earth from its proud position of central pre-eminence. But that does not bear the least analogy to the intended consequences of the Critical philosophy. The direct opposite is indeed true…[Kant’s] aim is nothing less than the first establishment of what may perhaps be described as a Ptolemaic anthropocentric metaphysic.
This complaint still comes up today. Quentin Meillassoux revives it in After Finitude, for instance, and proposes that we replace the term “Copernican revolution” with “Ptolemaic Counter-Revolution.” He footnotes Alain Renaut’s 1997 book, Kant aujourd’hui, yet the specific phrase “Ptolemaic Counter-Revolution” seems to come from Bertrand Russell’s Human Knowledge,* and even Smith in 1913 presents the terminological quibble as more or less well worn. He mentions a late nineteenth-century work by Thomas Hill Green, for example, which I’ll get to in a second.
Usually the purpose behind a sentiment like “this has already been done” is to belittle the authority of recent variations, and to sound the familiar battle cry of setting the record straight against ignoramuses (Mikhail Emelianov wants to score a point against Meillassoux and “neo-realists,” for example.) But that’s not what I’m after here. Aside from outlining the two basic approaches to the analogy (we’ve now seen one of them), I’d like to think about what dismissing or defending the Copernican analogy might reveal about the author’s motivations. The way old arguments about semantics such as this one get updated speaks to real changes taking place just underneath.
Continue reading “Ptolemaic or Copernican?”